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Executive Summary 
 
The New Zealand economy went through major restructuring, starting in the mid-1980s. 
As reforms began to take effect and expectations adjusted, unemployment in New 
Zealand has declined steadily and persistently since 1993-1994. Temporary changes in 
unemployment occur because of economic shocks, such as unanticipated monetary and 
fiscal policy shocks, productivity shocks, and financial crises, e.g., the Asian financial 
crisis and the recent global financial crisis. These events push the unemployment rate 
and its natural rate around, creating gaps between them and slowing the adjustment of 
the labour market to its natural rate. We estimate the natural rate of unemployment from 
the pools of workers who move in and out the labour force. Then we estimate the speed 
of adjustment of the observed unemployment rate to this natural rate over the period 
1992-2012.  
 
There have been concerns about the increase in the unemployment rate after the global 
financial crisis. Important issues in analysing the recent increases in the unemployment 
rate are whether these increases are cyclical versus structural and the speed of 
adjustment of the unemployment rate to its natural rate (NRU). We consider these 
issues by estimating the NRU and the speed of adjustment. We use labour market gross 
flows and a modified the Beveridge curve to estimate the NRU. We provide different 
estimates of the speed of adjustment. 
  
We found that first, the estimated time series of the natural rate of unemployment 
(NRU) in New Zealand to be significantly lower than the actual unemployment rate 
over the sample 1992-2012. Over the past two decades, the average NRU is estimated to 
be 4.6 percent whereas the average unemployment rate is 6.2 percent. So on average,
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the observed unemployment rate has been mostly higher than our measured NRU. In 
December 2012, we estimate the NRU to be somewhere between 4 and 4.5 percent 
while the unemployment rate is still much higher. Second, both the unemployment rate 
and the estimated NRU are persistent. Third, the level of the NRU is affected by 
unanticipated monetary policy shocks and by unanticipated fiscal policy shocks. 
Unanticipated monetary and fiscal policy shocks and TFP shocks reduce the NRU. 
Unanticipated fiscal policy shocks are associated with lower NRU and they have 
significant effects. Total factor productivity (TFP) shocks have much larger effects on 
the NRU and they are more significant than policy shocks. Fourth, available proxy 
measures of labour market institutions such as the minimum wage and union density 
have no effects in general, but union density seems to be positively associated with the 
NRU. Fifth, typically the speed of adjustment is a measure between zero and 1. Our 
estimates are between 0.10 and 0.50. On that scale, the speed of adjustment of the 
unemployment rate to the NRU take between 2 and 10 quarters to be complete. Sixth, 
the speed of adjustment increases after major recessions. There was a transitory increase 
in the unemployment rate in the late 1990s and early 2000s after the Asian financial 
crisis and similarly after the recent global financial crisis. The speed of adjustment 
increased markedly after the slowdown in the late 1990s and increased even faster after 
the most recent recession in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Seventh, the 
main components of the NRU are the job finding rate and the job separation rate (flows 
in and out of unemployment) indicate that the former is significantly more volatile than 
the latter. The latter is strongly negatively correlated with GDP over the business cycle 
frequencies. It increases sharply in recessions, but the magnitudes of the increase vary 
from one recession to another. Eighth, the Beveridge curve, which describes a negative 
relationship between the vacancy rate and unemployment, is not sufficient to draw 
conclusions about the NRU. It requires an additional curve, i.e., the job creation curve 
(JCC), which summarizes the demand for new jobs by firms. The resulting estimate of 
the NRU using this method is in line with the initial estimates: between 3.5 and 4.5 
percent in December 2012.
Abstract 
 
 
A persistent increase in the unemployment rate ignites speculations about whether the 
changes to unemployment are structural or cyclical. The New Zealand economy has 
been through major restructuring since the mid-1980s. The labour market’s institutional 
changes were the last in the sequence of these reforms. As reforms began to take effect 
and expectations adjusted, unemployment in New Zealand has declined steadily and 
persistently since 1993-1994. Along the way, however, transitory increases in 
unemployment occurred. Major increases occurred after the Asian financial crisis and 
the global financial crisis with similar dynamics.   
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1. Introduction 
 
A persistently high unemployment rate generates discussions and speculations 
that the increase in unemployment is structural and not cyclical, Diamond (2013). 
Typically, people do not worry about low unemployment, but that does not make 
it less structural. Structural unemployment refers to changes in demographics and 
sectoral shifts, which are persistent, and supply shocks, which are beyond the 
control of monetary and fiscal policies. Structural unemployment can also refer to 
changes in the composition of unemployment, i.e., change in the long-term 
unemployed or the demographic make-up of the unemployed (Lazear and 
Spletzer, 2012). In search theory (Pissarides, 2000) unemployment is frictional, 
and results from mismatches between jobs and workers. In such models, the 
labour market is rarely in equilibrium. 
 
Looking closer at the New Zealand data, the average percentage of the long-term 
unemployed (for more than 53 weeks) to the total unemployed over the period 
from 1986 to 2012 is 3.6 percent. This rate has been falling steadily over the 
period from 1995 to 2012. In 2008, it hit its lowest value of less than 1 percent. 
Then it began to rise again in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and the 
subsequent global slowdown. It was 2.9 percent in 2012. However, the percentage 
of the unemployed between 27-52 weeks has remained stable with an average of 
1.5 percent for the 25 years from 1986 to 2012 and only slightly increased after 
the global financial crisis.   
 
In New Zealand, unemployment has been declining steadily. Over the sample 
period 1992-2012, shocks and institutional changes affect the adjustment process 
by nudging the unemployment rate and its natural rate away from each other. The 
unemployment rate was in double digits in the early 1990s. The Employment 
Contracts Act was passed into law in 1991, which constituted a significant 
institutional change in the labour market. The average unemployment rate fell 
from 10.6 percent for the period from June 1991 to June 1993 to slightly above 7 
percent for the period from September 1993 to September 2000, a three 
percentage point fall.
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The Employment Relations Act, Working for Families, and other changes in the 
labour laws were introduced in the late 2000s; the unemployment rate fell to 4.5 
percent from December 2000 to September 2009, i.e., another three percentage 
point reduction. This steady and slow decline in the unemployment rate has the 
marks of a structural change in the economy. However, just like after the Asian 
financial crisis, there has been a transitory increase in the unemployment rate in 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis and the subsequent economic 
slowdown. The average unemployment rate from December 2009 to December 
2012 was 6.67 percent. This recent fast increase in the unemployment rate is high 
in comparison with the slow decline observed between 1992 and 2009. Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009), and Jorda, Schularick and Taylor (2011) show that jumps in 
the unemployment rate is a typical cyclical fluctuation, which follow most 
financial crisis.    .    
 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the recent increases in the unemployment 
rate; examine whether these increases are cyclical versus structural, and estimate 
the speed of adjustment of the unemployment rate to its natural rate (NRU). We 
consider these issues by estimating the NRU and the speed of adjustment. We use 
labour market gross flows, Hall (2005) and Yashiv (2007); and a modified the 
Beveridge curve to estimate the NRU, Daly et al. (2012). We provide different 
estimates of the speed of adjustment. 
2
 
 
The dynamic of the labour market, gross flows, and the Beveridge curve in New 
Zealand have been studied in the past by Chapple et al. (1996), Dutu et al. (2009), 
Griffiths (2013), Grimmond (1993), Silverstone and Bell (2011), Silverstone 
(2001, 2005), Silverstone et al. (1995), and Woolf (1989), and  Craigie et al. 
(2012) among others. This paper compliments the above literature, but it differs in 
a few ways. It studies the effect of the recent global financial crisis, provides 
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different methods of estimation, and modifies the Beveridge curve analysis along 
the lines suggested by Daly et al. (2012).  
 
There are eight main findings in this paper. First, the estimated time series of the 
NRU in New Zealand is significantly lower than the actual unemployment rate 
over the sample 1992-2012. Over the past two decades, the average NRU is 
estimated to be 4.6 percent whereas the average unemployment rate is 6.2 percent. 
So on average, the observed unemployment rate has been mostly higher than our 
measured NRU. In December 2012, we estimate the NRU to be somewhere 
between 4 and 4.5 percent while the unemployment rate is still much higher, 
which is consistent with Sliverstone and Bell (2011) finding. Second, both the 
unemployment rate and the estimated NRU are persistent. Third, the level of the 
NRU is affected by unanticipated monetary policy shocks and by unanticipated 
fiscal policy shocks. Unanticipated monetary and fiscal policy shocks and total 
factor productivity (TFP) shocks reduce the NRU. Unanticipated fiscal policy 
shocks are associated with lower NRU and they have significant effects. TFP 
shocks have much larger effects on the NRU and they are more significant than 
policy shocks. Fourth, available proxy measures of labour market institutions such 
as the minimum wage and union density have no effects in general, but union 
density seems to be positively associated with the NRU. Fifth, typically the speed 
of adjustment is a measure between zero and 1. Our estimates are between 0.10 
and 0.50. On that scale, the speed of adjustment of the unemployment rate to the 
NRU take between 2 and 10 quarters to be complete. Sixth, the speed of 
adjustment increases after major recessions. There was a transitory increase in the 
unemployment rate in the late 1990s and early 2000s after the Asian financial 
crisis and similarly after the recent global financial crisis. The speed of adjustment 
increased markedly after the slowdown in the late 1990s and increased even faster 
after the most recent recession in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
Seventh, the main components of the NRU are the job finding rate and the job 
separation rate (flows in and out of unemployment) indicate that the former is 
significantly more volatile than the latter. The latter is strongly negatively 
correlated with GDP over the business cycle frequencies. It increases sharply in 
recessions, but the magnitudes of the increase vary from one recession to another. 
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Eighth, the Beveridge curve, which describes a negative relationship between the 
vacancy rate and unemployment, is not sufficient to draw conclusions about the 
NRU, Daly at al. (2012). It requires an additional curve, i.e., the job creation 
curve (JCC), which summarizes the demand for new jobs by firms. The resulting 
estimate of the NRU using this method is in line with the initial estimates: 
between 4.0and 4.5 percent in December 2012.   
 
Next, we discuss the measurement of the NRU. In section 3 we derive an 
estimable equation for the speed of adjustment. Section 4 includes the estimation 
and analysis of the data. Section 5 modifies the Beveridge curve framework to 
estimate a third approximate measure of the NRU for New Zealand. Section 6 is a 
conclusion. 
 
2. Estimating the Natural Rate of Unemployment 
 
There are many different ways to estimate the natural rate of unemployment. We 
follow Yashiv (2007) and compute the natural rate of unemployment from the 
labour market gross flows data. Let the unemployment rate be tu and the natural 
rate of unemployment *tu . Let U be the pool of unemployed workers; N be the 
pool of non-employed workers – the out of labour force, and E be the pool of 
employed workers. There is a flow from EN  and NE  . Let these flows 
be UEM , which is hiring flows into employment from unemployment, and NUM be 
hiring flows from outside the labour force into employment. Let EUS and NUS be 
the separations rates corresponding to the hiring rates above. The unemployment 
dynamics are given by the following: 
 
UN
t
NU
tt
EU
t
UE
ttt FFEdPUU  )1(1 ,     (1) 
 
where UEtP is the job finding rate, i.e., flows from EU  , UMP
UEUE / ; EUtd is 
the separation rate from employment, which is ES EU / and UNt
NU
t FF  is the net 
inflow of workers from out-of-labour force N U. 
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Unemployment grows at a constant rate equal to the rate of growth of the labour 
force L in the steady state, say Lg and the unemployment rate is constant 
*u (lowercase), then: 
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And, EUL          (3) 
 
When the L is not growing (or immigration growth is constant) we get  
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, thus (6) reduces to: 
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Figure 1 plots the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate; the two 
estimates *1u and 
*
2u along with an estimate derived from the Band-Pass filter 
(Christiano and Fitzgerlad, 2003) for comparison. Table 1 reports the descriptive 
statistics. The averages of the NRU estimates *1u and 
*
2u are remarkably lower than 
that of the actual unemployment rate and they are equally volatile. The average 
unemployment rate over the past two decades is 6.2 percent whereas the gross 
flows suggest that the average NRU is approximately 4.6 percent.  
 
Figure 1 also shows that there is a large and a persistent gap between the actual 
unemployment rate and the NRU. This is consistent with labour market models 
with search friction (Pissarides, 2000). In such models, the matching of jobs with 
work seekers is not always successful. Thus, unlike the neoclassical model in 
which wages clear up the market, the labour market does not clear period-by-
period in search models. Some job openings remain unfilled and job seekers 
   
6 
remain unemployed. Given these estimates of the NRU and the gap with observed 
unemployment, we expect the speed of adjustment in the New Zealand labour 
market to be low.  
 
Our estimates of the NRU are sensible because the job finding rate UEP and the 
separation rate from employment EUd , which are the main components of our 
estimate of the NRU, are within the range of OECD estimates (Hobijn and Sahin, 
2007). Their samples vary across countries, but the average job finding rate across 
countries in the sample is about 13 percent. The U.S. has the highest job finding 
rate of 56.30, Australia has 17.05, and New Zealand is 21.71 over the period 1986 
to 2004. Our estimate for New Zealand over the sample from September 1990 to 
December 2012 is 20.17 percent. However, that job finding rate is relatively 
volatile with a standard deviation of 3.56. The OECD average estimate for the 
separation rate is 1.3. New Zealand was not included in their sample. Our estimate 
for New Zealand over the same sample is 1.0 with volatility one tenth of the job 
finding rate. Again, New Zealand separation rate is lower than the average rate of 
the OECD.  
 
3. The speed of adjustment of the labour market 
   
Assumes that the firm minimizes the expected present value of a loss function 
like:
3
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
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

 22*
0 2
)(
2
1
jtjtjt
j
j
t uuuEL

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where j is the discount factor. A loss arises when the employment level is 
different from the profit-maximizing level of employment and the cost of 
adjusting employment is measured by . 
 
The Euler equation is: 
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Solving the Euler equation gives the optimal policy: 
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where  is the stable root and u is 
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The following equation is an estimable stochastic equation for the speed of 
adjustment: 
 
tttt uuu    )( 1
* ,  10        (8) 
 
To estimate the single equation (8) we use our previously estimated measures 
of *tu .  
 
We also estimate the speed of adjustment in a system of two equations. The idea 
is that the NRU is endogenous and can be affected by a number of shocks, which 
we must control for. There is an argument about the effects of institutions and 
shocks on the NRU. Nickell et al. (2005) argue that differences in unemployment 
across OECD countries can be explained by differences in labour market 
institutions. Phelps (1994), Oswald (1997), and Pissarides (2000), for example, 
argue that shocks to global capital or product markets drive the natural rate.  
 
The first equation in the system is the same equation (8) – in levels; and a second 
equation is for the NRU as a function of its past values and a vector of shocks and 
variables representing labour market institutions. The system is given by: 
 
tttt uuu 11
* )1(          (9) 
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*
1
*    ,       (10)  
 
where includes TFP, unanticipated monetary and fiscal policy shocks and two 
measures of labour market institutions: the growth rates of the minimum wage to 
average wage ratio and the union density. Only unanticipated shocks have real 
effects. It is a standard assumption that anticipated monetary policy shocks have 
no effect on real variables, but unanticipated shocks do, see for example Barro and 
Gordon (1983). The assumption is that, in equilibrium, people form expectations 
and the policymaker optimizes in each period subject to the way that people form 
expectations. Still, measuring monetary policy shocks is highly controversial in 
the literature, see for example, Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Cochrane (1998), 
Baglino and Favero (1998), Rudebusch (1998), Christiano et al. (1999), and 
Bernanke et al. (2005). In this paper we assume that the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand (RBNZ) sets policy each period as if it is using the Taylor rule (Taylor, 
1993).
4
 This is a form of flexible inflation targeting, in which the central bank 
reacts to both inflation’s deviation from the target and to the output gap.  
 
 Let the Taylor rule be:
5
 
 
tttttt iyri   121 )1(]
~)([ ,   (11) 
 
where ti is the nominal 90-day interest rate; r is a constant denotes the natural real 
rate of interest; t is quarterly inflation rate; is the inflation target set equal to 1.5 
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 Plantier and Scrimgeour (2002) provide estimates of the Taylor rule for New Zealand. A recent 
updated estimate of the Taylor rule by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is found in Kendall and 
Ng (August 2013). I became aware of it after this paper was written. They estimated the response 
to inflation’s deviation from the target over the period 1992q1 -2012q4 to be 0.5, i.e., 1.5 in total 
and the response to the output gap to be also 0.5. Their results seem to suggest that the RBNZ has 
been following the Taylor rule rather precisely over that sample. Taylor has repeatedly criticized 
the fed for not adhering to first principles and adhering to simple rules in the past decade, see for 
example Taylor (2012).    
 
 
5
See Taylor (1993), and for New Zealand estimates Plantier and Scrimgeour (2002). 
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(midpoint of the 1-3 percent target); and ty
~ is a measure of the output gap 
measured by the HP filter. The coefficient  measures the serial correlations in 
interest rate.
6
 The equation is estimated using Least Squares with a Newey-West 
variance-covariance matrix for the standard errors. The unanticipated monetary 
policy shocks are the residuals t .
7
   
 
The second unanticipated aggregate demand shock is a fiscal policy shock, 
namely, nominal government expenditures shock. Measurement of this shock is 
equally controversial.
8
 In the absence of any model, we regress the growth rate of 
nominal government expenditures on a constant and a number of lags. Testing for 
the significance of the lags leaves four lags only. The unanticipated shocks are the 
residuals from this regression.  
 
We also include the log of TFP. The TFP is computed using a constant return to 
scale Cobb-Douglas production technology 21
a
t
a
ttt LkTFPy  , where ty is real 
GDP; tK is the stock of capital; tL is working age population (15-64); 1a and 2a are 
the shares of capital and labour. These shares are approximately 0.40 and 0.60, 
respectively, and they are estimated averages from the National Income Account 
by the ratio of gross operating surplus to GDP. The stock of capital is computed 
using the Perpetual Inventory Method with the initial quarterly stock of capital is 
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There are some arguments about whether the central bank actually observes inflation at the 
current period or whether lagged inflation should be used, or inflation’s forecast. We will assume 
that current inflation is largely observed by the central bank to avoid measuring expected inflation. 
There are more arguments about the measurement of the output gap. We use the HP filter. Finally, 
there is also an argument about interpreting the coefficient of the lagged interest rate. It has been 
suggested that the central banks pursue interest rate smoothing, see Drew and Plantier (2000), but 
we will adhere to the econometrics of estimating this equation and assume it is rather important to 
have a lagged dependent variable to soak up the serial correlation, see Rudebusch (2002). 
 
7
 My own research on estimating the Taylor rule suggests that the equation is very sensitive to the 
method of estimation. GMM estimates for example, are different and they are highly sensitive to 
the choice of the instruments. See Razzak (2003). 
 
8
For example, see Lucas (1973), Barro (1977) and (1978), and Barro and Rush 1980. 
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assumed to be three times as large as real quarterly GDP, and the depreciation rate 
8 percent.
9
  
 
Finally, we will examine the hypothesis that both institutions and shocks might 
influence the speed of adjustment. Phelps (1994) and Blanchard and Wolfers 
(2000) argue that shocks drive the natural rate of unemployment, but the speed of 
adjustment in the labour market is affected by labour market institutions. Smith 
and Zoega (2007) tested OECD data and found that institutions have no effect on 
the equilibrium level of unemployment. They found that institutions affect the 
transmission of global influences that determine the equilibrium level.  
 
To test this we make a function of the labour market institutions. This is 
particularly difficult in the New Zealand context for two reasons. First, the 
measurement of labour market institutions is difficult, especially when using 
quarterly data. There are no quarterly data to measure institutions. Second, we do 
not expect labour market institutions to change our estimates significantly because 
our sample of two decades is relatively a short period of time. Measurements 
notwithstanding, we will use data published by OECD on the minimum wage and 
the union density as measures of New Zealand’s labour market institutions.    
We will estimate a state-space system where the speed of adjustment is a state 
variable, affected by the shocks above and the two labour market institution 
measures mentioned above. The OCED data for the minimum wage / average 
wage ratio are annual and available from March 1992 to December 2011. Union 
density is only available from 1999 to 2011.
 10
  We use the Quadratic Match 
Average method to have quarterly data. We use the growth rates in the 
regressions. The sample, however, will be shorter. Unfortunately, having both the 
speed of adjustment and the natural rate of unemployment as state variables in a 
state-space system is not straightforward. All the shocks above, except for TFP, 
                                               
 
9
It goes without saying that such a method is prone to measurement problems stemming from the 
assumptions used in the construction of the data. That said, however, it is a widely used method 
and is probably better than using expenditures data. 
  
 
10
 May et al. (2003) has a longer series, which begins from 1991. We do not access to these data. 
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are I(0) – stationary – by construction. But we will test and show that 
TFP, tu and
*
tu are cointegrated so the regressions are balanced in terms of the 
number of unit roots.  
 
4. Estimation 
The time series properties of the data 
 
We present a number of regressions. We estimate the single equation (8) and the 
system of equation (9) and (10). Then we estimate a state-space system with the 
speed of adjustment as a state variable, and examine the effects of various shocks 
and labour market institutions on it. Finally, we estimate the effects of the shocks 
and labour market institutions on the job finding rate and the job separation rate.  
 
Before we estimate anything, we examine the time series properties of the data. 
The variables tu ,
*
1u and 
*
2u  have slowly decaying autocorrelation functions. 
Figures 2, 3, and 4 plot the autocorrelation functions. Shocks to unemployment 
and the NRU die off only slowly, more so for the unemployment rate than the 
NRU. This persistence is confirmed by formal tests for unit root. The three 
variables are individually tested for the presence of a unit root using a battery of 
common test statistics with different specifications (with or without linear trend) 
and lag structures tested using a variety of information criteria. The tests could not 
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. Although all common tests for unit root 
suffer from small sample problems and low powers against stationary alternatives, 
the results are consistent with the literature where the unemployment rate is 
usually found to be persistent. These statistics suggest that the slow declining 
unemployment rate and the NRU over the sample are more likely to be driven by 
institutional changes in the labour market and in the rest of the economy.  
 
Similarly, we used a variety of commonly used tests for cointegration. We test the 
unemployment rate, NRU and TFP in levels. We reject the hypothesis that there is 
no cointegration. This result is consistent with both micro and micro theory, 
whereby these variables are highly linked,(Blanchard and Katz,1999). Thus, we 
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can estimate the speed of adjustment using a single equation model and the 
systems of equations described earlier in levels.  
 
Stability of the parameters  
 
We also test for the stability of the estimated parameters. The instability might 
occur because of the change in institutions. The Employment Contracts Act was 
passed in 1991, before the beginning of our sample, but the Employment 
Relations Act was introduced in 2000. And, there are other institutional changes 
such as Working for Families which was introduced in 2005 and the 90-day trial 
period for employment in 2009. We test for stability of the parameters using the 
Chow test and the likelihood ratio test.  
 
Identification 
 
For the system of equations, we also check whether the system is identifiable. The 
system of equation (9) and (10) satisfies the order condition, which is a necessary 
but not sufficient and the rank condition, which is a sufficient condition for 
identification. The system is over-identified.  
 
Single equation estimate of the speed of adjustment 
 
Table 2 reports two single-equation estimates of the speed of adjustment. Each 
equation has a different measure of the NRU, *1tu and 
*
2tu , which are defined in 
equations (2) and (4). The results show that the speeds of adjustments are 0.09 and 
0.1, respectively. The estimates are low. The parameters are stable as indicated by 
the tests for stability reported in table 2. Low speed of adjustment is defensible if 
the labour market is largely described by a search and matching type model and 
the stylized fact that we use estimates for the NRU, which are significantly far 
removed from observed unemployment.    
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System of equation estimates 
 
Table 3 reports the estimates of the speed of adjustment using the system of 
equations above. The table has seven columns. The first column reports the 
coefficients. The next six columns are divided into two blocks, one for using *1tu as 
a measure of the NRU and the other is for *2tu . For each we report three 
regressions. The first column of the first block includes the shocks only. The 
second includes the shocks plus the minimum wage / average wage growth rate as 
a measure of institutions, and the third, includes the shocks, the minimum wage / 
average wage and the union density as another measure of institutions. The 
samples are different because the labour market institution variables are shorter 
than the rest of the data. The same is for the second block.  
 
The estimated speed of adjustment is still treated as a constant parameter. The 
estimates are nearly identical to those reported from the single-equation estimate. 
The unanticipated monetary and fiscal policy shocks are significant, but the latter 
is more so than the former. Unanticipated expansionary fiscal policy reduces the 
NRU. And TFP shocks have negative significant level effects (semi-elasticity) on 
the NRU in the long run. The increase in TFP reduces the NRU significantly. The 
minimum wage / average wage growth rate is insignificant in all regressions, but 
the growth rate of the density function increases the NRU. 
 
State-space 
 
In addition to the stability tests we reported in table 2 earlier, we estimate the 
speed of adjustment as a state variable in a state-space form. We allow the speed 
of adjustment to be a state variable and a function of the shocks defined and the 
labour institution variables defined earlier.   
ttttt uuu   1
*       (12) 
tttt   1       (13)  
ttt v 1        (14) 
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Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients and figure 5 plots the smoothed time-
varying estimate of the speed of adjustment. We report four estimates in table 4, 
which has two blocks: one is when the variances of the state variables are 
estimated from the data. The other is where we imposed small variances to 
smooth the data. Under each block we have two columns. One column without the 
labour institution variables and the other with them included because the labour 
market institution variables are shorter samples. The filtered estimates are less 
than 0.10, which are very consistent with our previous estimates.  
 
The smoothed estimates are interesting. First, they are higher than our previous 
point estimates; the final estimates are 0.44 and 0.50. Second, the speed of 
adjustment has been increasing over time. Third, unanticipated monetary policy 
shocks have negative effects on the speed of adjustment. These shocks reduce the 
NRU. Since the NRU is below the unemployment rate in New Zealand, these 
shocks increase the gap between the observed unemployment rate and the NRU, 
hence a slower speed of adjustment. Neither unanticipated fiscal policy shocks nor 
TFP shocks have any effect on the speed of adjustment. Fourth, the speed of 
adjustment increases after recessions. It increased after the Asian crisis in 1998 
and increased even faster after the recent global financial crisis. This finding 
seems consistent with Schumpeter (1934). The idea is that adjustments speed-up 
after recessions (depressions). The fact that the Schumpeterian creative-
destructive forces show up in faster adjustments is present in the data. Carroll et 
al. (2002) and Mills and Timmins (2004) provide empirical evidence of a rapid 
creation-destruction force in the New Zealand labour market. Also see McMillan 
(2004). Finally, none of the labour market institution variables is significant. The 
most plausible explanation for the lack of correlation is that the measures of 
institutions do not vary significantly over the sample, while unemployment does, 
thus the correlation is small.   
 
Figure 5 plots the smoothed estimates of the speed of adjustment as a state 
variable for the regressions which do not include the labour market institution 
variables. The top panel corresponds to the first estimate of the system where the 
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variances of the state variables are estimated from the data. The bottom panel is a 
smoother estimate in which we imposed arbitrary values for the variances to be 
0.001 and 0.07, respectively. 
 
To summarise, the estimates of the speed of adjustment varies across different 
methods of estimations and assumptions. The fixed-point estimate, where the 
estimator is a single equation or a system of equations, is very small, 0.10 (the 
speed of adjustment lies between zero and one). The state-space system estimate 
is larger in magnitude. The standard errors around the estimate are between 0.10 
and 0.50. These estimates are plausible because the speed of adjustment varies 
with the business cycle. They increase after recessions and the financial crisis, and 
decline during expansions.   
 
Job finding and job separation rates  
 
Before we turn our attention to the Beveridge curve we examine the relationships 
between the components of the NRU, namely the job finding rate and the job 
separation rate, see equation (4).  
 
The data are plotted in figures 6 to 15. Figure 16 plots the cyclical fluctuations 
(Band-Pass asymmetric filter, Christaino and Fitzgerald, 2003) of the job finding 
and the job separation rates. The former is pro-cyclical whereas the latter is 
strongly negatively correlated with the business cycle. The amplitudes of the 
cyclical fluctuations of the job separation rate are relatively higher than those of 
the job finding rate; even though the job finding rate is more volatile as shown 
earlier. Although the job separation rate increased sharply during the 1998 
recession in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, it increased relatively less 
in the 2000-2001 recession and sharply after the most recent recession in 2010. 
The amplitude of the cycle in the recent recession is lower than the one after the 
Asian financial crisis. The job finding rate, however, is pro-cyclical with smaller 
amplitudes than the job separation rate.   
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The evidence from the U.S. data are controversial. The prevailing orthodoxy is 
that unemployment increases sharply during recessions and the job separation rate 
drives that process, Blanchard and Diamond (1990). This has been challenged by 
Hall (2005) and Shimer (2007), who argued that the job finding rate over the 
business cycle is highly volatile whereas the job separation rate is less volatile or 
acyclical. Yashiv (2007), Fujita and Ramey (2009), and Elsby et al. (2009) 
provide evidence that the job separation rate is the driver of high unemployment.  
These plots seem consistent with the Blanchard-Diamond (1990) view of the U.S. 
data that recessions are periods of sharp rise in unemployment. And they are also 
consistent with most recent findings that the job finding rate is pro-cyclical, see 
Hall (2005) and Shimer (2007), however, the job separation rate is not acyclical in 
New Zealand.    
 
Canova et al. (2013) argue, correctly, that the evidence above is based on 
unconditional correlation analysis, which makes the interpretation difficult. The 
response of the unemployment rate depends on the source of the shock.  
 
We examine the effects of the following shocks: the level of TFP, the two proxies 
for unanticipated demand shocks, the monetary policy shocks, and the fiscal 
policy shocks, as well as the two measures of the labour market institution, i.e., 
the growth rate of the minimum wage/average wage ratio and the growth rate of 
the union density.     
 
Table 5 and table 6 report regression results. Monetary and fiscal policy shocks do 
not affect the job finding rate. However, these shocks have significant effects on 
the job separation rate. In other words, policy shocks contribute more to job 
separation than job finding. Unanticipated expansionary policy shocks are 
aggregate demand shocks and they seem to reduce the job separation rate. This 
asymmetry is rather interesting even though it is only marginally significant, 
which should be tested further in future research. The question is why aggregate 
demand policies seem to be associated with job separation more than job finding. 
In both the job finding and job separation rate regressions, TFP shocks have very 
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sizable coefficients that are statistically significant. TFP reduces the job 
separation rate by more than increasing the job finding rate. Institutions are found 
to be statistically insignificant, hence not reported.
11
  
 
5. The Beveridge curve and the NRU 
 
Brauer (2007) views the NRU as the average rate of unemployment that would 
prevail in the absence of business cycle fluctuations. It represents frictional or 
structural unemployment. Frictional unemployment reflects the time spent by the 
unemployed to search for a job whereas structural unemployment reflects 
mismatches between labour demand and the skills and geographical location of 
the unemployed. 
 
The empirical relationship between vacancies (on the vertical axis) and 
unemployment rate (the horizontal axis) is the Beveridg curve (BC). Empirical 
analysis of New Zealand BC is in, for example, Craigie at al. (2012), Razzak 
(2009), and Silverstone (2006). The position of the BC may indicate the state of the 
economy over the business cycle. For example, the unemployment rate increases 
and vacancies decline during recessions. The curve shifts and changes in the slope 
occur often, which complicate the picture. The further away the shift of the BC 
from the origin the less efficient the matching processes is because a certain level of 
vacancy would be associated with a high level of unemployment. Inefficient labour 
markets are believed to indicate mismatches between the unemployed workers and 
the available jobs. In addition to mismatches, factors that may shift the BC curve 
may include skill mismatches, changes in the labour force participation rate, the 
unemployment duration, and policy changes.   
 
                                               
11
 We experimented with the lags of the shocks. We added up to four lags (arbitrarily). None of the 
lags is found to be significant, except for the third lag of the unanticipated monetary shocks in the 
job finding equation. We also tried the U.S. output gap as a measure of global demand shocks, and 
the variance of the U.S. output gap as a proxy for uncertainty in the global economy. None is 
found to be significant. The statistical results are not reported. 
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Recent advances in this literature modify the theory of the BC. Daly et al. (2012) 
study that the BC. They provide a model, which essentially shows that the BC by 
itself does not determine an equilibrium combination of vacancies and 
unemployment. What is needed is another curve intersecting the BC in the same 
space. This curve is the job creation curve (JCC), which is determined by firms’ 
recruiting behaviours. Firms hire workers to produce output. They create vacancies 
up to a point where the expected value of a job match equals the expected search 
cost to fill the vacancy. The expected value of a job match is equal to the marginal 
product of labour. The expected search cost is a combination of the firm’s direct 
recruiting cost and the probability that a job is filled.  
 
The probability of filling a job increases with the unemployment rate. That implies 
that the JCC is upward sloping, which implies that firms create more job vacancies 
when unemployment is higher (we showed earlier that the speed of adjustment 
increased during recessions in New Zealand, especially after the most recent 
recession).  
 
The slope of the JCC depends on a number of variables, such as the job separation 
rate, the level of recruiting costs, and the value of jobs, which is reflected in labour 
productivity and the value of output.  In general, the slope depends on the structure 
of the product and labour markets in which firms operate and the wage bargaining 
process. It may also depend on the interest rate. Factors that shift the JCC include 
changes in the expected value of jobs that are associated with changes in the 
marginal product of labour. In recession, the aggregate demand falls; this reduces 
the marginal product of labour, and in turn reduces the value of creating jobs. This 
causes the JCC to rotate down (to the right) resulting in a higher unemployment rate 
with no shifts in the BC. Thus, the measured unemployment rate increases without a 
change in the NRU. Another example for shifts in the JCC is when the firm search 
costs change. For example, if the probability of filling a vacancy falls because of 
rising mismatch, the JCC rotates down. 
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To summarise, the equilibrium unemployment rate is determined jointly by the 
intersection of the BC and the JCC as in the following sketchy. Studying the BC alone 
is not sufficient to draw conclusions about the NRU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consider a shift in the BC from BC to BC’ (upward shift). For a given JCC, this shifts 
the equilibrium from point (a) to point (b). The equilibrium unemployment rate 
increases by less than the outward shift in the curve because the JCC is positively 
slopped. And the extent of the change in the equilibrium unemployment rate depends on 
the steepness of the JCC (its slope). For the equilibrium unemployment rate to change 
by the same amount of the outward shift in the BC, the slope of the JCC must be flat, or 
must shift outward or downward as well, as in the movement from point (a) to (c). The 
insight is that the shift in the BC and by how much is insufficient to explain what causes 
the unemployment rate to change. Information about the job creation rate is needed, i.e., 
the demand of labour by the firm. Also, to distinguish what part of the increase in the 
unemployment reflects purely cyclical fluctuations in labour demand, and what parts are 
related to other transitory and permanent factors that cause a rise in the NRU, we have 
to understand what causes the shifts of the BC and JCC and the permanency of these 
shifts.  
 
Job Creation JCC 
JCC’ 
BC 
BC’ 
a 
b 
c 
Unemployment rate 
Vacancy rate 
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Figure 17 plots the BC for New Zealand using the vacancy rate and the observed 
unemployment rate. Our vacancy rate data are derived from the ratio of job 
advertisements (ads) to the labour force. There are two data series for job ads, which 
vary in quality and have some sharp movements. The newspapers ad series is the 
longest. It is a monthly series from the 1990s. The other series is the Internet ads series, 
which is shorter from 2004 onwards. We use newspaper job ads data. 
 
The BC shifts. Typically, a shift away from the origin implies less matching efficiency; 
however, Daly et al. (2012) argue that such a shift is hard to interpret for three reasons. 
First, the BC not only shifts but also tilts so that a horizontal shift is not uniform across 
all levels of the vacancy rate. Second, estimating real-time movements in the BC is 
difficult because the size of the implied shift depends heavily on the specific month or 
quarter chosen. These shifts vary, and recently observed points are near a very flat 
segment of the BC, which combines large changes in the unemployment rate with small 
changes in vacancy rates. Third, figure 18 shows that following a labour market shock, 
the movement of the unemployment-vacancy rate follows a counter-clockwise 
adjustment pattern. This pattern occurs because firms can adjust their targeted hiring 
rapidly when the labour market conditions improve, but the matching process that will 
effectively reduce unemployment lags behind the increase in labour demand, as shown 
by Blancahrd and Diamond (1989).  
 
Daly et al. (2012) explain that the unemployment-vacancy combinations observed in the 
aftermath of a recession may represent the labour market adjustment process back to a 
stable BC rather than an outward shift in the BC. It is important to note that changes in 
the estimates of NRU during the period 2009 and 2012, which we plotted in figure 1, 
are much smaller in magnitude than the shifts in the BC plotted in figure 17.   
 
Daly et al. (2012) provide a rudimentary estimate of the JCC and plot that against the 
observed BC to accurately assess the change in the NRU for the United States. They 
estimate a long-run JCC by regressing the vacancy rate on a constant term and the 
NRU. The latter is taken from the Congressional Budget Office. We do the same for 
New Zealand. Only estimates of the JCC from March 2004 to December 2012 using the 
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vacancy rate tv ,which is based on the newspapers ads only and our measure of the 
NRU, *2u , produce an upward slopping JCC. The estimated curve looks like this: 
 
tv  = 0.096+ 0.032 
*
tu  
 (0.3697) (0.1196) 
2R  0.27  
 
The equation is estimated by OLS. Consistent standard errors are estimated using the 
Newey-West method. P values are in parentheses. The intercept is insignificant. The 
slope coefficient is only marginally significant. These estimates are obviously crude, but 
they are the only estimates for New Zealand. Figure 19 superimposes the estimated JCC 
curve above on the BC (the vacancy-unemployment space) for the period 2004 to 2012 
(the JCC passes through the origin since the intercept in the regression above is 
statistically indifferent from zero).
12
 
 
Each point represents the cyclical movements along a given BC. In other words, each 
point represents the cyclical fluctuations in labour demand for a given natural rate of 
unemployment. The solid upward line is the estimated relationship between the average 
level of vacancies and our estimate of the NRU, which is reported in the regression 
above. So, we can read the value of the NRU on the x-axis from a point where the BC 
and the JCC intersect, which is only in December 2008. At this point, the NRU is 3.56 
percent, which is even smaller than the average values reported in table 1, and the 
vacancy rate is 0.48 percent. The NRU in December 2012 is somewhere between 4 and 
4.5 percent, which is not far from our previous average estimate of 4.6. However, the 
average unemployment rate is 6.2 percent indicating that the labour market is still far 
away from its natural rate. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
12
 The BC (the vacancy-unemployment rate) has an intercept 2.5 and a negative slope -0.34. Both are 
significant at the 95 percent level. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The stochastic process that has been driving the unemployment rate in New Zealand is 
best described by a persistent decline, which is a result of a product of structural and 
institutional reforms since the mid-1980s. While these forces have been working to 
lower the unemployment rate, various shocks nudged the process along the way and 
might have caused a few episodes of transitory, sometimes sharp, increases in 
unemployment, which might have delayed adjustments. The underlying natural rate of 
unemployment behaves similarly, yet it is estimated to be significantly lower than the 
unemployment rate. Our average estimate over the past two decades is about 4.5 percent 
compared with the unemployment rate’s average, which is 6.2 percent. 
  
The natural rate and its main components, the job finding rate and the job separation 
rate, are significantly affected by total factor productivity shocks but not by labour 
market institutions. TFP shocks lower the natural rate of unemployment by reducing the 
job separation rate by more than increasing the job finding rate over the business cycle. 
Unanticipated monetary and fiscal policy shocks also affect the job finding and 
separation rate in the same way.  
 
We may accept the stylized fact that the labour market adjustment has been incomplete 
over the past two decades, which is consistent with search theory (Pissarides, 2000). 
Our estimated speed of adjustment is a low of 0.10. The smoothed state-space estimate 
of the speed of adjustment noticeably increases after recessions. It increased during the 
recession in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, and increased by much more 
during the recent recession in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. These stylized 
facts are consistent with the Schumpeterian creative-destructive theory, and with New 
Zealand empirical evidence reported in Carroll et al. (2002), Mills and Timmins (2004), 
and McMillan (2004).  
 
Unanticipated monetary shocks reduce the speed of adjustment because they reduce the 
job separation rate over the cycle, which reduces the natural rate and increases the gap 
between the natural rate and unemployment rate. The fact that labour market institutions 
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do not affect the speed of adjustment seems in consistent with Blancahrd and Wolfers 
(2000) and Phelps (1994), who argue that the speed of adjustment in the labour market 
is a function of institutions rather than shocks, but maybe because the data we have are 
badly measured, or maybe because they do not change significantly over the sample, 
thus the correlation with the speed of adjustment is weak.   
 
The two variables that represent the labour market institutions, i.e., the minimum wage / 
average wage ration and the union density, are not well measured (we converted annual 
data to quarterly data) and that they are shorter than the rest of the variables. We found 
no significant effects from these variables on the speed of adjustment. However, the 
latter is positively associated with the natural rate of unemployment.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Different Measures of the Natural Rate of 
Unemployment *tu , March 1992 –December 2012  
 Mean 
(percent) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Unemployment Rate 6.21 1.87 
(i) Structural Measure *1u  4.60 1.75 
(ii) Structural Measure *2u  4.67 1.75 
(i) This is measured in equation (2). 
(ii) This is measure in Equation (4). 
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Table 2 
Least Squares Single Equation Estimates of the Speed of Adjustment 
 (March 1992 –December 2004) 
tttt uuu   
*
1
* )1(  
Coefficient   Estimate P value Estimate P value 
*
1tu  0.099 (0.0000) - - 
*
2tu  - - 0.10 0.0000 
2R  0.97  0.97  
Chow test 0.18 (0.9473) 0.20 (0.9344) 
Log Likelihood Ratio 0.77 (0.9425) 0.87 (0.9285) 
*
1tu is measured in equation (2). 
*
2tu is measured in equation (4).  
We use HAC standard errors and co-variance (Bartlett kernel – Newey-West 
fixed bandwidth 4. 
Chow is a test of the null hypothesis that there are no break points in 2000q1-
2000q4. (Employment Relations Act). Test distributed 78,4F ; for breaks in 
2005q1-2005q4 (working for families); and for breaks in 2009q1-2009q4 (the 
90-day trial period for employment).   
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Table 3 
Estimating Speed of Adjustment in a System of Equation 
tttt uuu 11
* )1(     
tttt uu 2
*
1
*     
 *
1tu  
*
2tu  
 Mar92-dec12 Mar92-Dec11 Mar99-Dec11 Mar92-dec12 Mar92-Dec11 Mar99-Dec11 
  0.098 
(0.0000) 
0.098 
(0.0000) 
0.098 
(0.0000) 
0.10 
(0.0000) 
 
0.10 
(0.0000) 
0.10 
(0.0000) 
2R  0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
  0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
  0.72 
(0.0000) 
0.70 
(0.0000) 
0.61 
(0.0000) 
0.73 
(0.0000) 
0.71 
(0.0000) 
0.61 
(0.0000) 
        
tUMPS  -0.21 
(0.1824) 
-0.23 
(0.1780) 
-0.43 
(0.0702) 
-0.24 
(0.1338) 
-0.26 
(0.1156) 
-0.43 
(0.0699) 
tUFPS  -0.09 
(0.0139) 
-0.08 
(0.0175) 
-0.10 
(0.0277) 
-0.09 
(0.0080) 
-0.09 
(0.0091) 
-0.10 
(0.0173) 
tTFPln  -0.38 
(0.0003) 
-0.41 
(0.0004) 
-0.48 
(0.0009) 
-0.38 
(0.0003) 
-0.41 
(0.0003) 
-0.49 
(0.0007) 
tWw )/ln(
 
- -0.08 
(0.4265) 
-0.03 
(0.8404) 
- -0.09 
(0.3962) 
-0.05 
(0.7876) 
tUDln  - -  0.24 
(0.0449) 
- -  0.24 
(0.0512) 
2R  0.66 0.65 0.60 0.67 0.67 0.61 
  0.84 0.85 0.74 0.82 0.83 0.73 
-
*
tu ’s are as defined in equation (2) and (4). P values are in parentheses.  
- includes:UMPS are unanticipated monetary policy shocks are the residuals from the Taylor 
rule;UFPS are unanticipated fiscal policy shocks are the residuals from an AR(4) of the growth rate of 
nominal government expenditures; TFP shocks are total factor productivity shocks measured by the residuals 
of a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas production function; Ww / is the ratio of minimum wage to average 
wage; andUD is union density. 
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Table 4 
The Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the State-Space System  
ttttt uuu   1
*  
tttt   1  
ttt v 1  
 Variances of state variables estimated Variances of state variables imposed 
 Mar92-Dec12 Mar2000-Dec11 
   0.43 
(0.0000) 
0.17 
(0.0658) 
 0.27 
(0.0057) 
0.06 
(0.7245) 
 - final estimate  0.51 
(0.0000) 
0.48 
(0.0000) 
 0.45 
(0.0000) 
0.44 
(0.0000) 
      
tUMPS  -0.03 
(0.0045) 
-0.05 
(0.0205) 
-0.02 
(0.0352) 
-0.05 
(0.2547) 
tUFPS  -0.04 
(0.8925) 
-0.56 
(0.1429) 
-0.08 
(0.8142) 
-0.68 
(0.3406) 
tTFPln  -0.0001 
(0.9444) 
0.0006 
(0.8875) 
-0.0003 
(0.8502) 
-0.0000 
(0.8991) 
tWw )/ln(  - 0.29 
(0.8806) 
- -0.25 
(0.9346) 
tUDln  - 0.48 
(0.6899) 
- 0.73 
(0.7781) 
t - final estimate  1.66 
(0.0000) 
3.23 
(0.0000) 
 3.02 
(0.0000) 
4.16 
(0.0000) 
Log Likelihood -12.01 -4.55 -17.61 -12.98 
Akaike criterion  0.46 0.52  0.55 0.79 
Schwartz criterion  0.64 0.83  0.67 1.02 
Hannan-Quinn criterion  0.53 0.64  0.60 0.87 
-
*
tu ’s are as defined in equation (4).- includes:UMPS are unanticipated monetary policy shocks are the residuals from the Taylor 
rule;UFPS are unanticipated fiscal policy shocks are the residuals from an AR(4) of the growth rate of nominal government expenditures; 
TFP shocks are total factor productivity shocks measured by the residuals of a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas production 
function; Ww / is the ratio of minimum wage to average wage; andUD is union density. The latter two measures of labour market 
institutions are insignificant, hence they are not reported.  
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Table 5 
The Job Finding Rate and Shocks 
Dependent Variable tjfr  
Sample Dec 1993 – September 2012 
 Coefficient P value 
Constant 4.10 0.0056 
1tjfr   0.57 0.0000 
tUFPS   0.85 0.2078 
tUMPS    0.01 0.4687 
tTFPln   0.92 0.0236 
2R  0.49  
  0.11  
HAC standard errors and co-variance (Bartlett kernel – Newey-West fixed 
bandwidth 4. 
Table 6 
The Job Separation Rate and Shocks 
Dependent Variable tjsr  
Sample Dec 1993 – September 2012 
 Coefficient P value 
Constant -4.27 0.0003 
1tjsr  0.60 0.0000 
tUFPS  -1.43 0.0616 
tUMPS  -0.05 0.0181 
tTFPln  -1.37 0.0003 
2R  0.73  
  0.11  
HAC standard errors and co-variance (Bartlett kernel – Newey-West fixed 
bandwidth 4. 
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Figure 1 
The unemployment rate and three estimates of the natural rate of unemployment 
   
38 
Figure 2 
The autocorrelation function of the unempoyment rate 
March 1992 – December 2012 
 
       
       Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Probability 
       
             . |*******       . |******* 1 0.944 0.944 77.642 0.000 
      . |******|       . | .    | 2 0.891 -0.009 147.59 0.000 
      . |******|       .*| .    | 3 0.820 -0.192 207.54 0.000 
      . |***** |       . | .    | 4 0.747 -0.065 257.90 0.000 
      . |***** |       . | .    | 5 0.676 0.006 299.69 0.000 
      . |****  |       .*| .    | 6 0.594 -0.142 332.39 0.000 
      . |****  |       . | .    | 7 0.522 0.023 357.93 0.000 
      . |***   |       . | .    | 8 0.451 0.002 377.24 0.000 
      . |***   |       . | .    | 9 0.383 -0.034 391.40 0.000 
      . |**    |       . | .    | 10 0.325 0.019 401.70 0.000 
      . |**    |       . |*.    | 11 0.278 0.087 409.37 0.000 
      . |**    |       . | .    | 12 0.241 0.016 415.19 0.000 
      . |**    |       . | .    | 13 0.215 0.048 419.90 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 14 0.195 0.016 423.84 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 15 0.182 0.006 427.32 0.000 
       
 
 
Figure 3 
The autcorrelation function of the natural rate of unemployment *1u  
March 1992 – December 2012 
 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       
             . |******|       . |******| 1 0.801 0.801 55.886 0.000 
      . |******|       . |**    | 2 0.767 0.348 107.65 0.000 
      . |***** |       . | .    | 3 0.666 -0.042 147.22 0.000 
      . |****  |       **| .    | 4 0.532 -0.239 172.82 0.000 
      . |****  |       . |*.    | 5 0.501 0.137 195.79 0.000 
      . |***   |       .*| .    | 6 0.364 -0.141 208.07 0.000 
      . |**    |       . | .    | 7 0.319 0.016 217.59 0.000 
      . |**    |       . | .    | 8 0.241 -0.034 223.11 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 9 0.171 -0.004 225.93 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 10 0.127 -0.053 227.51 0.000 
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Figure 4 
The autocorrelation function of the natural rate of unemployment *2u  
March 1992 – December 2012 
 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
       
             . |******|       . |******| 1 0.810 0.810 57.098 0.000 
      . |******|       . |**    | 2 0.773 0.340 109.74 0.000 
      . |***** |       . | .    | 3 0.675 -0.045 150.38 0.000 
      . |****  |       **| .    | 4 0.545 -0.233 177.23 0.000 
      . |****  |       . |*.    | 5 0.518 0.159 201.80 0.000 
      . |***   |       .*| .    | 6 0.378 -0.174 215.02 0.000 
      . |**    |       . | .    | 7 0.327 -0.005 225.03 0.000 
      . |**    |       . | .    | 8 0.247 -0.031 230.82 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 9 0.183 0.048 234.06 0.000 
      . |*.    |       .*| .    | 10 0.137 -0.076 235.88 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 11 0.088 0.049 236.64 0.000 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 12 0.068 0.015 237.11 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . |*.    | 13 0.082 0.170 237.78 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 14 0.086 0.007 238.54 0.000 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 15 0.088 -0.030 239.34 0.000 
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Figure 5 
The Smooth Estimates of the Speed of Adjustment using State-Space 
Variances Estimated from the Data 
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Figure 6 
Job Finding Rate and TFP Shocks 
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Figure 7  
Job Finding Rate and Unanticipated Monetary Policy Shocks  
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Figure 8 
   
42 
Job Finding Rate and Unanticipated Fiscal Policy Shocks 
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Figure 9 
Job Finding Rate and the Growth Rate of Minimum Wage/Average Wage Ratio 
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Figure 10  
Job Finding Rate and the Growth Rate of Union Density 
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Figure 11 
Job Separation Rate and TFP Shocks 
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Figure 12 
Job Separation Rate and Unanticipated Monetary Policy Shocks 
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Figure 13 
Job Separation Rate and Unanticipated Fiscal Policy Shocks 
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Figure 14 
Job Separation Rate and the Growth Rate Minimum Wage / Average Wage 
Ratio 
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Figure 15 
Job Separation Rate and the Growth Rate of Union Density 
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Figure 16 
Business Cycle Fluctuations of Job Finding and Separation Rates 
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Figure 17 
The Beveridge Curve 
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Figure 18 
Counter-clockwise adjustmen 
 
 
Figure 19 
The New Zealand Long – Run Job Creation Curve 
 
 
 At a point such as Dec 2012, the Beveridge curve sfifts down and JCC shifts 
down to the right. 
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Data Appendix 
 
tu  The unemployment rate Household Labour Force 
Survey, Statistics New 
Zealand. 
U  The pool of unemployed 
workers 
Gross flows, Stats NZ. 
E  The pool of employed workers Gross flows, Stats NZ. 
N  The pool of workers not in the 
labour force 
Gross flows, Stats NZ. 
L  Labour force Gross flows, Stats NZ. 
i  90-day interest rate Reserve Bank 
t  Inflation rate Reserve Bank 
tG  Government expenditures  Reserve Bank 
ty  Real GDP Reserve Bank 
WAP  Working age population (15-
64), as a measure of labour in 
the production function. 
Statistics NZ 
I  Is fixed capital formation used 
to compute the stock of capital 
Statistics NZ 
   
v  Vacancy rate usually measures 
job ads in newspaper and the 
Internet. 
ANZ, Stats NZ. 
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